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INTRODUCTION
The concept of capital punishment and its origin may be difficult to
identify; however, societies throughout time have implemented it as a form
2
3
of punishment. Originally recognized as a private vengeance, the State,
through its sovereign authority, accepted the power to punish those who

1
Luis M. Fusté is a J.D. graduate from Florida International University College of Law, May
2006, and has worked in law enforcement for over 23 years.
2
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-35 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
3
Id. at 333.
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4

violated its laws. The history of capital punishment under common law
5
commenced in England as early as the Thirteenth Century. While early
6
English law recognized eight major capital crimes, capital punishment’s
7
reach escalated to well over 200 numbered offenses. Although capital punishment was less common in the colonies, American colonies codified capital offenses early in 1636 when the Massachusetts Bay Colony enumerated
8
13 acts as punishable by death.
In America, opposition to the death penalty came early in its brief
9
capital punishment jurisprudence. In 1794, Pennsylvania abolished capital
punishment for all crimes except murder in the first degree, which was held
10
to encompass all willful, deliberate and premeditated killings.
This
change prescribed mandatory death penalty for all those convicted of mur11
der. Following Pennsylvania’s reform, Virginia and several other states
12
enacted similar statutes. This anti-capital punishment movement traveled
across the country, yet it lost its momentum with the commencement of the
13
Civil War. Movements aimed at ending or reforming the use of the death
penalty have accompanied capital punishment since it was imported from
14
Europe.
To this day, the United States continues to struggle, not only with the
15
imposition of the death penalty, but with the method of execution. According to a Gallup Poll survey, two in three Americans say they are in fa16
vor of the death penalty for convicted murderers; however, when asked to
4
Id. n.41 (noting that the Code of Hammurabi is one of the first known laws to recognize death
as a form of punishment for homicide).
5
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971).
6
Furman, 408 U.S at 334 (recognizing treason, petty treason (killing of husband by his wife),
murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson as capital crimes).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 335 (using the Old Testament as the source, the crimes punishable by death were: idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, assault in sudden anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape,
rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital trial, and rebellion).
9
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198; see also Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since
Furman, is the Death Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in
Capital Sentencing, 38 VAL. U. L. REV 1399, 1405 n.34 (2004) (noting that the Colonists were less eager
to apply the death penalty when compared to the British).
10 Furman, 408 U.S. at 336; McGaurtha, 402 U.S. at 198.
11 Furman, 408 U.S. at 336.
12 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198.
13 Cochran, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that as a capital abolishment movement was sweeping the
country, Maine enacted a statute that stayed all executions for one year after convictions. This movement ended when the Civil War caused a shift to the nation’s focus. The movement emerged once again
after the war; however, penal reform, the Great Depression as well as World War I and II placed a permanent halt in the efforts to abolish the death penalty).
14 Furman, 408 U.S at 342.
15 Id.
16 Lydia Saad, Support for Death Penalty Steady at 64%, Slightly Lower than in Recent Past, THE
GALLUP ORGANIZATION, December 8, 2005, http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=20350&pg
=1 (last visited May 9, 2006).
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choose between life imprisonment and death, the numbers are quite lower.
18
Currently, 38 states still have death penalty statutes. Internationally, however, there are more nations that have abolished capital punishment than
19
those who continue to impose it.
While a general opposition to the death penalty continues in this coun20
try, today the greater concern turns on who is to determine whether a per21
son is sentenced to death: the judge or the jury? Modern capital punishment jurisprudence starts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v.
22
Georgia. The impact Furman had on this nation’s utilization of capital
punishment can only be rivaled by a string of recent Supreme Court decisions which, when examined collectively, reveal a new turning point in the
23
Court’s evolving capital punishment jurisprudence.
Through an analysis of various decisions, this Comment will trace the
United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of capital punishment and how these decisions have varied in light of the challenges asserted by those seeking relief. Additionally, by examining these cases with
a focus on Florida’s capital punishment jurisprudence, this Comment will
illustrate how the development of capital punishment jurisprudence and
Sixth Amendment protection by the courts has rendered Florida’s current
17

Id.
Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org
/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited August 24, 2006).
19 Id. (88 countries have abolished Capital Punishment while 69 continue to exercise death penalty statutes. In the U.S. 60 prisoners were executed in 2005, bringing the year-end total to 1004 executed since the use of the death penalty was resumed in 1977. As of January 1, 2006, over 3,400 prisoners are under a sentence of death. The death penalty is also provided under U.S. federal military and
civilian law).
20 See Bruce Fein, Death Penalty Usurpations, WASH. TIMES, Feb.10, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20040209-090307-1481r.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
The following are several of the organizations who oppose the death penalty and were consulted during
Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W. 3d 397 (Miss 2003), whereby the Missouri Supreme Court held that executing individuals under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes was prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment: American Psychiatric Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Friends Service Committee, Mormons for Equality and Social Justice, The Rabbinical
Assembly and the United States Catholic Conference.
21 Benjamin F. Diamond, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Florida’s Flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REV. 905, 906 (2003) (this comment complements Diamond’s article by adding the more recent United States Supreme Court decisions which reveal the
Court’s undertaking in expanding Sixth Amendment protection).
22 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 at 291, (holding that the death penalty as applied by the states
was arbitrary and capricious; states must adopt statutes that provide “guided discretion”).
23 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (holding that an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment reliant on the finding of a fact,
that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004) (defining statutory maximum as “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”).
18
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death penalty statute unconstitutional. The sequence of cases will reveal
that whereas Florida’s capital punishment sentencing scheme did at one
time conform to the Supreme Court’s mandate under Furman, today it is
unconstitutional.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PRE-FURMAN
Since the Furman decision appears to be the point of demarcation on
the new era of change with respect to application of the death penalty, a
brief look at capital punishment jurisprudence that preceded Furman is appropriate. Merely six months prior to the decision in Furman, the Supreme
24
Court ruled McGautha v. California. In McGautha, the Court determined
that statutes that permitted a jury to impose the death penalty without governing standards—thereby entrusting the imposition of a death penalty to
the jury’s absolute discretion—did not infringe upon a defendant’s constitu25
tional rights. Because the petitioners were from different states, the Su26
preme Court dealt with statutes from both California and Ohio.
Dennis Councle McGautha, a co-defendant to a robbery-homicide was
27
convicted of murder and sentenced to death under California law. Prescribed by California statute, punishment for a capital felony was deter28
mined in a separate proceeding following the trial on the issue of guilt.
James Edward Crampton was sentenced to death under an Ohio statute after
29
being convicted of murdering his wife. The applicable Ohio death penalty
statute at the time provided that the jury alone would determine guilt and
punishment after a single trial and in a single verdict. Furthermore, the trial
30
or the appellate court could not modify the jury’s death verdict.
Although the Court was dealing with the statutes of two states, it recognized that the decision would be based on whether the Federal Constitution prohibited the procedures used by each of the states to sentence the

24

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Id. at 183-85.
26 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05 (1954).
27 Id. at 185; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (“The guilt or innocence of every person charged
with an offense for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be
determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been found guilty of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, and has been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall
fix the penalty.”).
28 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 185.
29 Id. at 187.
30 Id. at 182-95. (the jury was instructed as follows: “If you find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree, the punishment is death, unless you recommend mercy, in which event the punishment
is imprisonment in the penitentiary during life”) Id. at 194. Four hours later, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty, with no recommendation for mercy. Id. at 182. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05.
(the statute permits the verdict to stand unless there is prejudicial error vitiating the conviction or insufficient evidence to convict penalty).
25
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31

defendants to death. Both defendants had a common claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process: “[T]hat the absence of
standards to guide the jury's discretion on the punishment issue is constitu32
tionally intolerable.” The Court conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the
history tracing capital punishment back to colonial times and through the
33
modern era. It recognized that academic and professional sources have
recommended that jury sentencing discretion should be guided by standards
34
of some sort, that several states had enacted new criminal codes adopting
features of the Model Penal Code, and that others had adapted laws with
35
respect to murder and the death penalty in other ways. However, none of
36
the states had adopted statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.
In evaluating the States’ practices using federal constitutional stan37
dards, the Court rejected the due process argument. The Court reasoned
that sole discretion of the jury to determine life or death in capital cases is
not offensive to the Constitution and that an established set of standards to
guide the jury would be impossible. They noted that, “[t]o identify before
the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators
which call for the death penalty and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing author38
ity appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.” Furthermore, the Court reasoned that although “a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system” must be present in sentencing
matters, juries are guided by their “innate capacity” and thus better suited to
comprehend the values of the community than those which may be devel39
oped by legislature.
The Court placed a great deal of faith on jurors and their moral obligation as guidance. However, it recognized that there may be superior means
40
of rendering a fair decision. The dissent as expressed by Justice Brennan
31

McGautha, 402 U.S at 196.
Id.
33 Id. at197-203.
34 Id. at 202 (noting that the American Law Institute had made such a recommendation in 1959
and that as recent as 1970, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws published a
Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code which called for mandatory procedural provisions for
capital sentencing that a jury was required to consider before rendering its decision).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 203.
38 Id. at 204; see also Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 79, 102-04 (2002) (noting that the Court’s decision was not based on analysis or democratic theory,
it relied on jurors’ sense of responsibility for their task, since jurors faced with rendering such an tremendous decision will act with appropriate moral seriousness and moral rationality).
39 McGautha, 402 U.S at 204.
40 Id. at 221 (acknowledging that while the Federal Constitution required solely that trials be
fairly conducted and that guaranteed rights of defendants be thoroughly respected, the American Law
Institute and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws had concluded that bifur32
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called for the reversal of both death penalties and the imposition of a set of
41
guidelines to aid the decision maker in rendering judgment.
FLORIDA’S PRE-FURMAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SENTENCING SCHEME
The governing capital punishment statute in Florida during the pre42
Furman era was similar to that of the Ohio statute previously discussed.
Under Florida law at that time, if an individual was found guilty of an offense punishable by death, the jury’s verdict imposed the penalty of death
43
unless a recommendation of mercy was made by a majority vote. The
sentence of death in a capital case was therefore mandatory with excep44
tions. In deciding whether to impose a life or death sentence, the sentencing body in Florida was left with no specific standards which it could draw
45
from to guide its decision-making process. In Florida, the jury had broad
parameters in what it could consider when deciding whether the death pen46
alty or life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. Furthermore, under the then-existing statute, when the right to a jury trial was waived, or
when the defendant pled guilty or nolo contendre, the judge sitting alone
made the determination whether to impose the sentence of death or life im47
prisonment after it found the defendant guilty of a capital offense.
The jury’s unfettered discretion in determining whether to impose the
death penalty or life imprisonment were challenged under various theo48
ries. One such case was Thomas v. Culver, wherein a black male convicted of raping a white female was sentenced to death under Florida’s capi49
tal punishment statute of the time. The defendant argued that Florida’s
statute gave the jury “uncontrolled and unfettered power to impose the
cated trials and standards for jury sentencing discretion were superior means of dealing with capital
cases).
41 Id. at 250, 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the statutes before the Court as “stark
legislative abdication” since there wasn’t “the slightest attempt to bring the power of reason to bear on
the considerations relevant to capital sentencing.” Supervision of this jury process insures consistency in
decisions and in its absence “it can amount to nothing more than government by whim, and a government by whim is the very antithesis of due process.”) Id.
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05 (death penalty was imposed absent a recommendation for
mercy by jury).
43 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971) (stating in pertinent part: “A defendant found guilty by a jury of
an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommendation
to mercy by a majority of the jury. When the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority
of the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment”); see also King v. Moore, 831
So. 2d. 143, 150 (Fla. 2002).
44 Hargave v. Florida, 366 So. 2d. 1, 7 (Fla. 1979).
45 King, 831 So. 2d at 150.
46 See State of Florida ex rel. Thomas v. Culver, 253 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1958)
47 Id.
48 Id. (noting that defendant Jimmie Lee Thomas challenged the jury’s lack of guidance under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
49 Id.
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death sentence on some and not to impose it on others found guilty of the
same crime,” and thus was contradictory to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
50
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Court of Appeals rejected his argument and reaffirmed the capital
sentencing jurisprudence of that time by asserting that due to the “uncontrolled character of the determinations that are confided to the jury” and the
“inviolability” associated with the jury room, the statute, which allows the
jury to render all determinations, was not unconstitutional in its applica51
tion. The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Andres v. United States, where it held that where a statute which provided
for a jury to decide whether the accused should or should not be capitally
punished, the lower court “sufficiently explained the scope of the jury’s
discretion in granting mercy” by stating that the discretion was entirely
52
within the discretion of the jury.
These cases illustrate that when determining whether a defendant who
had been found guilty of a capital offense was to be sentenced to life in
prison or to death, the Constitution did not mandate standards to guide the
jury in its determination. Even when issues of disparate treatment, unfair
application of death penalty statutes, and due process concerns were raised
before the courts, capital punishment jurisprudence preferred “to leave to
juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment
53
within legally prescribed limits.” Despite alternative sentencing schemes
54
which would appear to ensure some level of equality, the courts continued
to assert that “[t]wo-part jury trials . . . have never been compelled . . . as a
55
matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.”
Yet, the argument that unregulated jury discretion may be problematic
56
was not foreign to the Supreme Court. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that empowered juries,
without definite standards to govern their discretion or determination, in
assessing costs against acquitted defendants with a threat of imprisonment
57
until the costs were paid. The Court held that due to the statute’s lack of
50 Id. at 508 (arguing that based on statistics over a period of 20 years, “Negroes convicted of rape
as a class and because of their race, were sentenced to death more often than white persons convicted of
the same crime.”).
51 Id.
52 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 744 n.4 (1948).
53 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 151 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399, 405 (1969)).
54 See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202-03 (discussing sentencing schemes that, while not constitutionally mandated, could be adopted by the states); see also id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating
that the Due Process Clause authorized the Court to ensure that “no State takes one man's life for reasons that it would not apply to another.”).
55 Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 151 (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1969)).
56 Giaccio, 382 U.S. 399.
57 Id. at 401.

56
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standards, a defendant was unable to protect herself from “arbitrarily and
discriminatory imposition[s] . . . .” Therefore, it was held that the statute
58
failed to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause. In what would
later become the general principle of modern-capital punishment jurisprudence, the Court in Giaccio established that a statute that “[is] so vague and
standardless . . . and leaves . . . jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not [violated the] premise
that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal
59
standards that courts must enforce.”
THE END OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES
On June 29, 1972, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court found that the
death penalty, as applied by the statutes under review, was cruel and un60
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded that capital punishment per
61
se was unconstitutional, and an insult to human dignity. Yet Brennan’s
concurring opinion provides an insight to the Court’s evolving standards of
capital punishment jurisprudence at that time:
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the
executed person's humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person
punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison does
not lose the right to have rights. A prisoner retains, for example, the
constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to be free of cruel
and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a “person” for purposes
of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. A prisoner
remains a member of the human family. Moreover, he retains the right
of access to the courts. His punishment is not irrevocable. An executed person has indeed “lost the right to have rights . . .. ‘His execu-

58

Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 403 (while holding that the lack of standards was violative of the Due Process Clause in
this particular instance, the Court was quick to point out two factors: first, the Court reached this decision because the issue did not involve a penal statute and second, this decision should cast no doubt on
the constitutionality to leave to juries’ findings the power to fix punishments).
60 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
61 Id. at 297-99 (Brennan, J. concurring) (arguing that the imposition of the death penalty was per
se unconstitutional, and distinguishing the death penalty from all other forms of punishment imposed by
the states, “[d]eath is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its
enormity); see also id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J. concurring) (arguing that the death penalty was excessive
and unnecessary and violated the Eighth Amendment).
59
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tion is a way of saying, you are not fit for this world, take your chance
62
elsewhere.’”
The Court in Furman established that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia and Texas was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the imposition of the death
63
penalty was administered in an “unlimited and unguided manner.” The
Court, in recognizing that death was a different kind of punishment from
any other which may be imposed by the states, and that the states were applying this punishment without guidance, struck down all state capital punishment statutes on the ground that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s
64
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. While the Court declined to find
65
capital punishment itself unconstitutional, it did rule that the application of
capital punishment governed by statutes that afforded a sentencing body
discretion as to whether a human life should be taken or spared, “must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
66
and capricious” application. The five Justices that made up the majority
had their own rationale as to why the statues under review were unconstitu67
tional. Conversely, Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that the death
68
penalty was per se unconstitutional. Justice Douglas was concerned that
death penalty statutes that lacked standards by which to guide the jury
69
would result in race and class bias. Justice Stewart, who was not convinced that racial discrimination had been proven, nevertheless concluded
that the legal system which imposes a sentence of death “so wantonly and
so freakishly” could not be tolerated under the Eighth and Fourteenth
70
Amendments. Justice White also reasoned similarly to Justice Stewart in
that “the [death] penalty [is] . . . so infrequently imposed that the threat of
71
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”
Despite the diverse approaches by the Court in reaching its decision,
the result in Furman was a categorical attack on all capital punishment statutes that permitted broad, unguided discretion, and ultimately resulted in an

62 Id. at 290 (Brennan, J. concurring) (citing Stephen, “Capital Punishments,” 69 FRASER' S
MAGAZINE 753, 763 (1864)).
63 Id. at 239-40.
64 Cochran, supra note 54, at 1412 (discussing that the Court’s 5-4 decision seemed to signal the
demise of the death penalty).
65 Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring).
66 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
67 See supra notes 65-66 (discussing how each justice held the death penalty, as applied by the
states, to be unconstitutional).
68 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
69 Id. at 250 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“[t]he death sentence is disproportionately imposed and
carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups”).
70 Id. at 238 (Stewart, J. concurring).
71 Id. at 313 (White, J. concurring).
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end to the imposition of death in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In
73
light of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
all capital sentencing statutes had to provide procedural safeguards that
guide and restrain the discretion of the sentencing authorities when deter74
mining between the death penalty and life imprisonment. In the years
following Furman, thirty-five states rushed to enact new capital sentencing
75
statutes.
CAPITAL SENTENCING POST-FURMAN: THE ROAD TO RECOVERY
It was not long before newly-amended statutes were challenged before
the United States Supreme Court. In 1976, the Supreme Court handed
down five decisions regarding capital punishment and the application of
76
newly-enacted death penalty statutes.
Louisiana and North Carolina’s
statutes were held to be unconstitutional because that they employed man77
78
datory sentencing. The other three states received the Court’s approval.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court took note that Georgia had taken steps to
cure the infirmities associated with the Furman decision by providing pro79
cedural safeguards when seeking the death penalty. To avoid the application of the death penalty in an arbitrary manner, Georgia’s sentencing
scheme provided guided discretion and allowed a jury to make the determi80
nation as to the presence of aggravating factors. The jury’s findings of

72 Frank Leonard Madia, Death Penalty Jurisprudence: The Difference Between Life and Death,
14 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 73, 82 (2000).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
74 Id. at 81-84.
75 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (“The most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States
have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the
death of another person. And the Congress of the United States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing the
death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death.”).
76 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
77 Roberts, 428 U.S. 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (“A . . . constitutional shortcoming of the
North Carolina statute is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
death.”).
78 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262.
79 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 (“The Georgia statute, as amended after our decision in Furman . . .
retains the death penalty for six categories of crime: murder, kidnapping for ransom or where the victim
is harmed, armed robbery rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking. . . . The capital defendant’s guilt or innocence is determined . . . by a trial judge or a jury, in the first stage of a bifurcated trial.”).
80 Id. at 164-65 (“[T]he judge is also required to consider or to include in his instructions to the
jury any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of
(10) statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence . . . . Before a convicted defendant may be sentenced to death . . . the jury, or the trial judge in cases tried without a jury,
must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 10 aggravating circumstances specified in the statute.”).
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aggravating and mitigating factors were to be taken into consideration be81
fore sentencing a person to death.
The Court continued to evolve its application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment when challenges to the constitutionality of various
82
states’ death penalty statutes were brought before it. As the post-Furman
era continued, the Court struck down some of the very statutes that it had
83
84
previously held to be valid. Previously held to be constitutional, Georgia’s death penalty statute, which required the existence of “aggravating
circumstances” before imposing a death penalty, was subsequently struck
85
down for vagueness.
FLORIDA’S POST-FURMAN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEME
As a result of Furman, Florida had the nation’s first “post-Furman”
86
death penalty statute. Although different than what the Supreme Court
87
reviewed under Georgia’s sentencing scheme in Gregg, the Court upheld
Florida’s hybrid system in Proffitt v. Florida where a judge and not a jury
88
determined the sentence. While all procedural designs adopted by the
states to impose the death penalty must comport to the Furman mandate,
89
90
only three states utilize a “hybrid” system: Florida, Alabama, and Dela91
ware.
81

GA. CODE § 17-10-31.1.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173 (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
83 Penry, 492 U.S. at 320. Although in Jurek v. Texas the Court held the Texas statute constitutional. This was due to the fact that it permitted the sentencer to consider relevant mitigating evidence
in imposing a sentence. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-72. In Penry, the Court found that its application was
not in accordance with the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment. Penry, at 302. The defendant argued that
“the jury was unable to fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence.” Id. at 303. “The
Texas death penalty statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner by precluding the jury from
acting upon the particular mitigating evidence he introduced.” Id. at 320.
84 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
85 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 426, 428. (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment, it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty . . . [I]t must channel the sentencer’s discretion by “clear and objective standards” that provide “specific and detailed guidance,” and that “make rationally reviewable the
process for imposing a sentence of death.” . . . [A] death penalty “system could have standards so vague
that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a
pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.”).
86 Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of the Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate
Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 18 (1998).
87 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (noting that Georgia’s new sentencing scheme required that a jury
make specific findings of facts as to the presence of aggravating and or mitigating circumstances before
the imposition of death).
88 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242-48 (“The basic difference between the Florida system and the Georgia
system is that in Florida the trial judge determines the sentence rather than the jury; the Florida procedures for imposition of the death penalty satisfy the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman”).
89 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2002).
82

58

FIU Law Review

108

[2:97

Under current Florida law, when a jury finds a defendant guilty of a
capital felony, the defendant can be sentenced to death or life imprisonment
92
without parole. However, to determine whether a sentence of death or life
imprisonment will be imposed, the statute directs the court to follow the
93
procedures set forth in Section 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes. During
this second procedure, the trial judge, along with a jury (preferably the
same jury that rendered the guilty verdict) conducts a separate proceeding
94
on the issues of penalty. The “guided discretion” provided by the statute
allows the sentencer to consider specified enumerated aggravating and
95
mitigating factors when deciding between death and a prison sentence.

90

ALA CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994).
DEL. CODE ANN. TI. 11, § 4209(d) (1995).
92 See FLA. STAT. ANN § 775.082 (West 2004). Penalties:
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in § 921.141 results in
findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall
be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.
93 Id.
94 This sentencing phase is mandatory to all death penalty cases since the Court’s decision on
Furman; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1) (West 2002) (“If the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a
hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trail judge may summon
a special juror or jurors.”).
91

95

See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (5)(6) (West 2002). Aggravating circumstances:

(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit,
any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult
resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary;
kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device
or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental
function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of
his or her official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official engaged in the performance of his or her official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in
part, to the victim's official capacity.
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Regardless of general admissibility rules under the rules of evidence,
the court may allow any evidence as to any matter it deems relevant to the
nature of the crime and character of the defendant during this second pro96
ceeding. The state and the defendant may present arguments for or against
97
the sentence of death. After hearing all of the evidence with regards to
98
aggravating or mitigating factors, the jury renders an advisory sentence.
The jury’s advisory sentence, which determines whether the mitigating circumstances are present to offset the aggravating circumstances, is reached
99
by majority decision rather than unanimous vote.

(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
(m) The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability,
or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim.
(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member, as defined in s. 874.03.
(6) Mitigating circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or
her participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform
his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against
imposition of the death penalty.
See also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242 (“Florida trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to
assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life, and their decisions
are reviewed to ensure that they comport with other sentences imposed under similar circumstances”).
96 See generally Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242. (The court permits all evidence it deems to have probative
value. This over inclusive approach does not permit any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or Florida.).
97 Id.
98 FLA.STAT. § 921.141 (2) (West 2002). Advisory Sentence By The Jury - After hearing all of
the relevant evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based on the
following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
99 Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 710 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring) ( “[I]n Florida,
the jury's advisory recommendation in a capital case is not statutorily required to be by unanimous vote[,
t]he jury's advisory recommendation may be by mere majority vote.”).
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Yet, this advisory sentence is not binding on the trial court’s deci100
sion. The final determination as to whether the defendant is sentenced to
101
However, while the jury’s sendeath rests exclusively with the judge.
tence is only advisory in character, the court must give deference to the
jury’s sentence when it weighs all of the possible factors and renders its
102
Anytime the court imposes the death penalty, the court
own decision.
103
must support its verdict by specific findings of fact.
Even though the
104
jury’s recommendation is not binding on the court as a matter of law, the
Florida Supreme Court has recognized the important role the jury plays in
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme and has at times referred to the jury as
105
the “cosentencer.” Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it is the court and
106
not the jury who determines the proper sentence to be administered. The
court’s power to determine the sentence remains intact even when it goes
107
against the jury’s recommendation. Hence, despite a majority vote by the
jury recommending a life sentence, the court may impose a sentence of
108
death.
On the other hand, this power to override is not absolute. Florida Supreme Court case law has limited a court’s statutory authority to override a
jury’s advisory sentence to situations “in which the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable per109
son could differ.” In Spaziano, the United States Supreme Court held that
the application of the Florida standards allowing a trial court to override a

100

FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (West 2002).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (findings In Support of Sentence of Death-“Notwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court . . . shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or
death . . . .”).
102 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 518 (1997) (noting that “sentencing judge in a “weighing”
State (i.e., a state such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed
against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial’s sentencing phase) is required to give deference
to a jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation.”).
103 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b) (West 2004).
104 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding that under Florida’s sentencing scheme the
jury’s recommendation is not binding of the court).
105 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 702; see also Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (Finding
that Florida had essentially split the weighing process in two. The jury would weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and the result of that is then in turn weighed by the court's process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.).
106 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3).
107 Id.
108 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b). See also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 (“[The] death penalty is not
frustrated by, or inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual cases is
determined by a judge . . . We see nothing that suggests that the application of the jury-override procedure has resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty . . . [r]egardless of the
jury’s recommendation, the trial judge is required to conduct an independent review of the evidence and
to make his own findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”).
109 Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of
the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2003).
101
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jury’s recommendation of a life sentence by a majority vote did not violate
the United States Constitution and had not resulted in arbitrary or discrimi110
natory application of the death penalty.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not
constitutionally necessary for a jury to decide the appropriate sentence to be
111
imposed. Another safeguard found within the statute is that all sentences
of death are automatically subject to review by the Supreme Court of Flor112
ida within two years. These standards provided by the legislature, which
regulate the sentencing proceedings, assure that the death penalty will not
113
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The Supreme Court of Florida continues to assert that defendants are
adequately protected by way of the statute through its procedural safeguards
114
The United States Supreme Court, which
and post conviction reviews.
has analyzed the Florida statute’s operation in detail several times, contin115
ues to uphold Florida’s capital sentencing scheme as constitutional.
With the appearance of “post-Furman” capital punishment statutes
116
comparable to Florida, and with the Court’s refusal to find these unconsti110 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 448 (1984); See also Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 459
(Fla. 1984) (holding that if the facts supporting the sentence of death are clear and convincing, “the
ultimate decision as to whether the death penalty should be imposed rests with the trial judge despite a
jury’s recommendation of life.” (citing Hoy v. State, 353 So.2d 826, 832 (Fla. 1977))).
111 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251. (“On their face these procedures, like those used in Georgia, appear to
meet the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial
judge, is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine
whether the death penalty shall be imposed. This determination requires the trial judge to focus on the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the individual defendant.”).
112 See FLA. CONST. art. V, Sec 3(b)(1) (stating in pertinent part “the Supreme Court . . . Shall hear
appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (4)
(West 2002).
113 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.
114 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698. (Wells, J., concurring) (noting that in spite of shifting constitutional analysis over the years, Florida’s statute provides “effective post-conviction review of the reliability of a defendant’s trial and sentencing proceedings”); Id. at 720 (Pariente, J. concurring in result only)
(“Florida’s . . . capital sentencing scheme . . . [provides] a defendant convicted of first-degree murder
“with five steps between conviction and imposition of the death penalty” . . . The five steps . . . are (1) a
post-conviction hearing before a jury, (2) a jury recommendation, (3) determination of the sentence by
the judge, (4) written findings in support of a death sentence, and (5) review by this Court.”)(internal
citations omitted).
115 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 526 (1997) (noting that “Florida employs a three-stage sentencing procedure. First, the jury weighs statutorily specified aggravating
circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and renders an “advisory sentence” of either life
imprisonment or death . . . . Second, the trial court weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and enters a sentence of life imprisonment or death; if the latter, its findings must be set forth in
writing. The jury's advisory sentence is entitled to “great weight” in the trial court’s determination . . . ,
but the court has an independent obligation to determine the appropriate punishment. . . . Third, the
Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death.”).
116 E.g. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(8) (1988); see also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
303 (1990) (upholding the Pennsylvania statute in holding that the statute had, “cured the constitutional
defect identified in Furman.”).
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tutional, it appeared as though the states had taken the Court’s direction in
Furman when drafting capital sentencing schemes that comported with the
117
Eighth Amendment.
State legislatures have continued to draft statutes
that comply with the directive provided by the United States Supreme
118
Court’s holding in Furman, and for the past 28 years, the United States
Supreme Court has held Florida’s structured “hybrid” sentencing system
119
constitutional and in compliance with Furman. While Florida’s sentencing statute has enjoyed the Court’s stamp of approval under various challenges, recent Florida Supreme Court decisions indicate the statute’s capital
120
sentencing procedure may very well be unconstitutional.
CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME
The United States did not execute anyone for four years following the
121
Furman decision. The decision in that case caused thirty-five states to
enact new statutes that would limit the sentencer’s discrimination and arbi122
trariness when deciding to impose a sentence of death. Four years after
123
Furman, Florida’s newly drafted statute was challenged in Proffitt.
In Proffitt, the petitioner stood trial and was found guilty of first124
degree murder. During Florida’s newly created separate sentencing hearing, the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending the sentence of
125
death. Based on the jury’s recommendation and the court’s own findings,
126
the petitioner was so sentenced. The petitioner argued that the imposition
of the death penalty under any circumstances was cruel and unusual pun127
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
At the time Proffitt came before the Court, the central concerns as to
the death penalty’s constitutionality were those issues addressed in

117

Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262

(1976).
118 408 U.S. at 313 (“A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a “meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).
119 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447;
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Lambrix, 520 U.S. 518.
120 King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (2002); Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693, 724 (Lewis, J., concurring in
result only).
121 Cochran, supra note 9, at 1416.
122 Id. at 1417; see also supra note 72.
123 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.
124 Id. at 246.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 247 (The court’s findings supporting the sentence were as follows: as to aggravating
circumstances (1) the murder was premeditated and occurred in the course of a felony (burglary); (2) the
petitioner has the propensity to commit murder; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and
cruel; and (4) the petitioner knowingly, through his intentional act, created a great risk of serious bodily
harm and death to many persons; no mitigating statutory mitigating circumstances existed).
127 Id.
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Furman. As long as a state’s sentencing scheme “assure[d] consistency,
fairness, and prevented the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
129
penalty,” the state’s newly drafted statute would prevail. The Court held
that the death penalty was properly imposed because under Florida’s sentencing scheme, the trial judge was required to focus on the circumstances
of that particular crime and the character of the individual defendant
130
through the statute’s mandatory aggravating and mitigating factors.
The central meaning of the Court’s decision was not whether a judge
or jury should determine the sentence given, but rather that the Constitution
only requires that the sentencing body be provided with a procedure which
131
furnishes guidance in determining the imposition of death. By assessing
early post-Furman decisions under the Eighth Amendment, the key to success for a capital sentencing statute was whether the death penalty was imposed in a capricious and arbitrary manner and thus would be tantamount to
132
cruel and unusual punishment.
One year after Proffitt, the Supreme Court had a second opportunity to
133
review and analyze Florida’s capital sentencing statute. The petitioner in
Dobbert argued that the Ex Posto Facto Clause prohibited the application of
the new statute, which changed the function of judge and jury in the imposition of death sentences because the crime had predated the statute, and at
the time he acted there was no valid death penalty statute in effect in Flor134
After the petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder, the
ida.
135
jury’s advisory recommendation was a sentence of life imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation, the judge sentenced the peti136
tioner to death.
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument and held that Florida’s statute
provided significantly more safeguards to the defendant than did the old
statute and that the change in the law was not only procedural but also ame137
liorative. Although the Dobbert decision addressed procedural concerns,

128

See Stevenson, supra note 109, at 1097.
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.
130 Id. at 247.
131 See Cochran, supra note 9, at 1423.
132 Id; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The Georgia
Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its discretion, while at the
same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a
statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to fail.”).
133 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
134 Id. at 287.
135 Id. at 287, (After weighing the aggravating against the mitigating factors, the jury by a 10-to-2
majority found sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh any aggravating circumstances).
136 Id. The trial judge under his authority overruled the jury's recommendation and sentenced
petitioner to death. In his written findings of fact, the judge provided detailed circumstances of some of
the horrors inflicted upon the victims. Id. at 285, 287.
137 Id. at 294-97.
129
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the Court made declaration worthy of noting. The Court asserted that with
the new Florida statute “[d]eath [was] not automatic . . . as it was under the
138
old procedure.” As this Comment will address, this single disinclination
139
is vital.
In Barclay v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to challenges
arguing that certain factors may not be taken into consideration by the “sen140
tencer” when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Elwood Barclay challenged the imposition of the death penalty when one of the “aggravating circumstances” relied upon by the trial judge to support the sentence
141
was not among those established by the Florida death penalty statute.
During the post sentencing hearing, the jury rendered an advisory sentence
142
recommending that Barclay be sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial
judge, overriding the jury’s recommendation, concluded that “[t]here are
sufficient and great aggravating circumstances which exist to justify the
143
sentence of death . . . .”
Barclay argued that the trial judge improperly used his criminal record
144
as an “aggravating circumstance.” The Court held that “the trial judge's
consideration of Barclay's criminal record as an aggravating circumstance
was improper as a matter of state law [because] that record did not fall
within the definition of any statutory aggravating circumstance, and Florida
145
law prohibits consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.”
However, the Court, citing Proffitt, held that irrespective of the violation of
state statute, “it [was] clear that [the plurality in Proffitt] saw no constitutional defect in a sentence based on both statutory and nonstatutory aggra146
vating circumstances.”
In 1994, the Court again examined Florida’s capital punishment sen147
tencing scheme in Spaziano v. Florida. This time, when confronted with
the challenges brought forth by the petitioner under the Sixth, Eighth, and
148
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court conducted a lengthy analysis.
The
petitioner argued that the statute, which allows a judge to override a jury’s
recommendation of life in prison, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-

138

Id. at 295.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
140 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
141 Id. at 941-42.
142 Id. at 944.
143 Id. at 945.
144 Id. at 956.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 957. The Court also noted that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Florida law prohibited
the admissibility of Barclay’s criminal record. Id. at 956.
147 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
148 See Stevenson, supra note 109, at 1099.
139
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bition against cruel and unusual punishment, because the jury’s verdict of
life should be final.
Furthermore, the override practice violated the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
149
Amendment. The petitioner urged that the practice of a judge overriding
a jury’s recommendation violated the Sixth Amendment and the Due Proc150
In framing his Sixth Amendess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ment claim, the petitioner was careful to limit his argument only to when a
judge overrode a jury recommendation and not to all capital sentencing
151
schemes that did not require a jury’s decision.
152
The United States Supreme Court rejected all of the challenges. The
Court acknowledged that while
[a] capital sentencing is like a trial in the respects significant to the
Double Jeopardy Clause [this] does not mean that it is like a trial in
respects significant to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.
. . . [T]he sentencer, whether judge or jury, has a constitutional obligation to evaluate the unique circumstances of the individual defendant
153
....
Furthermore, the Court also held that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment . . . has
[never] guarantee[d] the . . . right to a jury determination [on a capital sen154
tencing proceeding].”
In response to the petitioner’s argument that the laws and practice in
most of the States recognized that juries and not judges were better
equipped to make reliable capital-sentencing decisions, the Court noted that
while “a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice [that
alone] does not establish that contemporary standards of decency are of155
fended by the jury override.”

149 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-58. Petitioner Spaziano was indicted, tried and found guilty of firstdegree murder. The sentencing hearing was before the same jury, a majority of the jury recommended
life imprisonment. The trial court concluded that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. Id. at 450-52.
150 Id. at 458.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 449.
153 Id. at 459.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 464. In support of his argument, petitioner indicated “30 out of 37 jurisdictions with a
capital sentencing statute give the life-or-death decision to the jury, with only 3 of the remaining 7
allowing a judge to override a jury's recommendation of life.” Id. at 463. The Court responded to petitioner’s support by indicating that the “Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a
conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws. Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment” is violated by a challenged practice.” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
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In addressing Florida’s capital sentencing statute, the Supreme Court
found the statute’s application ensured that penalties were not being imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner since the statute had
“struck a reasonable balance between sensitivity to the individual and his
156
circumstances.” The Court further noted that “the responsibility on a trial
judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is [not] so fundamentally at
odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must
be required to alter its scheme and give final authority to the jury to make
157
the life-or-death decision.”
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Spaziano called into question Florida’s “trifurcated procedure for identifying the persons . . . who shall be sentenced to
158
The dissent noted that although Florida’s sentencing procedure
death.”
was “adopted by a democratically elected legislature,” its validity had been
159
160
presumed. However, this presumption may not be conclusive. Justice
Stevens suggested that the jury and not the judge may be better suited to
make the determination as to the appropriate level of punishment given that
the death penalty is an expression of the community’s outrage which is
161
“qualitatively different from any other punishment.”
At the time Spaziano was before the Court, only 3 of the 37 jurisdictions with capital sentencing schemes allowed a judge to override a jury’s
162
recommendation of life. The Court in Gregg noted that evolving social
163
standards affected juries in their decision to impose the death penalty, and
the dissent in Spaziano recommended that a representative of the community should be given the responsibility for making the life or death determi164
nation.
Collectively, the Gregg and Spaziano decisions established that

156

Id.
Id. at 465.
158 Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning who should determine whether an individual is
sentenced to death—a judge or jury—was premised on the Eighth’s Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause). This issue concerning Florida’s hybrid sentencing scheme continues today albeit
under a Sixth Amendment right. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 703 (2002) (Anstead, C.J.,
concurring) (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589) (“requiring findings of fact by a jury of sentencing factors that may affect the ultimate penalty and sentence [applies] to death penalty cases.”).
159 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 471 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
160 Id. (noting that the Eighth Amendment as envisioned by the Framers acts as safeguard against
punishment undertaken by the Government “in a manner inconsistent with a fundamental value”, albeit
with a legislative majority.).
161 Id. at 469 ((Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]very Member of this Court has written . . . endorsing
the proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is . . . different . . . and
hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given
offense.”).
162 Id. at 463 (Petitioner pointed out to the Court that 30 out of 37 jurisdictions with capital sentencing schemes allow a jury to make the life or death determination.).
163 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976).
164 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
157
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while society as a whole concurs with the existence of capital punishment,
165
the structure of how to impose death is open to experimentation.
Complying with the notion that the death penalty is closely related to
society’s view, Justice Stevens argued for “a more focused inquiry into the
Eighth Amendment implications of the decision to put an accused to death,
166
and the jury’s relationship to those implications.”
As cases involving
sentencing schemes have come before the Court, the struggle with a mechanism in which elements of a crime are decided by a jury and sentencing
167
factors are determined by a judge continue to surface. Whether sentencing factors are elements which must be decided by a jury and not a judge
will be determined by the Court in the future. Justice Stevens’ request in
Spaziano, calling for a more focused inquiry as to the jury’s role in sentencing, will be fulfilled as the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence develops.
Florida’s death penalty statute has continued to survive challenges as
seen when Paul C. Hildwin, Jr. appealed his conviction for first-degree
168
murder and the death sentence imposed by the trial court.
The Florida
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision and did not discuss Hildwin’s argument that the death penalty statute violated the Sixth Amendment
because the jury was not required to provide the judge with specific find169
ings as to the aggravating factors.
170
After an unsuccessful challenge before the Florida Supreme Court,
Hildwin was granted certiorari; once again, the United States Supreme
Court was to evaluate Florida’s death penalty statute. However, this time
the argument was framed around the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial
171
rather than an Eighth Amendment claim.
During the trial phase, the defendant was found guilty, and thus a sepa172
rate sentencing proceeding was held.
During that proceeding, the jury
unanimously recommended the imposition of the death penalty and the
judge concurred, submitting in writing the findings upon which the sen173
tence of death was based.
Despite the defendant’s contention that the
Sixth Amendment required the jury and not the judge to submit the findings
165

Id. at 464; Gregg, 468 U.S. at 195.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 477.
167 Julia Marcelle Foy Hilliker, The Evolving Meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Sentencing Effects of Aggravating Factors as Elements of the Crime, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 408
(2004).
168 Hildwin v. State, 531 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam).
169 Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638 (although the jury’s recommendation was unanimous, Hildwin argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because the statute authorizes the judge’s, and not the jury’s findings of fact to determine the sentence).
170 Hildwin, 531 So. 2d 124.
171 Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 639.
166
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174

of fact, the Court again upheld Florida’s sentencing system and held that
the Sixth Amendment did not bar a judge from making the ultimate deter175
mination.
The Court based its decision in this case on the principles established
in Spaziano—a judge’s imposition of the death penalty on an individual,
notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation for life, comported with the
176
Sixth Amendment. In essence, the right to a jury trial did not attach to a
177
capital sentencing hearing. The Court went on to establish that the sentencing scheme operated solely to guide the judge in selecting a penalty
within a range already established by the legislature; and thus the aggravat178
ing factor was not an element of the offense. Faced with a Sixth Amendment challenge, the Hildwin Court applied Spaziano as well as the rationale
179
of McMillian v. Pennsylvania. These cases recognized and distinguished
a state’s legislative power to define the elements of a crime, which are required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, from prohibited activity,
which exposes a defendant to criminal sanctions and is not an element of
180
the crime.
The Supreme Court would later recognize that Hildwin was
“the first case to deal expressly with fact-finding necessary to authorize
181
imposition of the more severe of alternative sentences.”
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was not the only judge/jury verdict
system to be constitutionally challenged. In Baldwin v. Alabama, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment was not violated when the judge imposed a sentence of death irrespective of the jury’s
182
verdict. The basis of the argument was that the judge relied on a jury’s
recommendation imposing the death penalty when the jury made the decision under a later repealed statute that provided no guidance and permitted
183
Citing
it to return a sentence of death along with its guilty verdict.
Spaziano, the Court held that it was “unwilling to say that there is any one
184
right way for a State to set up its capital-sentencing scheme.
174

Id.
Id. at 639-41 (noting that the Florida Supreme Court rejected Hildwin’s argument that a jury
and not a judge should determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors without discussion
holding that that claim had no merit and ultimately held that the judge’s findings were supported by the
evidence).
176 Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)).
177 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459.
178 Id. at 640 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)) (recognizing that the state
through its sentencing act which exposed a defendant to an increase in his sentence had not created a
separate offense which required a jury finding as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, state legislatures
had the power to determine the elements of a crime and the corresponding burden of proof).
179 McMillan, 477 U.S. 79, 86-88, 93 (1986).
180 Id.
181 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 250 (1999).
182 Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985).
183 Id. at 373 n.1, 378.
184 Id. at 389.
175
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Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that the death sentence was not unconstitutional because “the sentencing procedure was
saved by the fact that it was the trial judge who was the true sentencing
authority, and he considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances be185
fore imposing sentence.”
Similar to Florida’s sentencing scheme where the jury renders a recommendation, Ohio’s death penalty statute was upheld by the Sixth Circuit
186
Court of Appeals in Greer v. Mitchell. The defendant argued that permitting the jury to only recommend a sentence as opposed to imposing a sentence would “minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the
187
appropriateness of death.” To marginalize a juror’s sense of responsibility the defendant claimed violated the Eighth Amendment as the U.S. Su188
preme Court had held in Caldwell v. Mississippi. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals distinguished Caldwell by asserting that the jury in Greer was in
fact mindful of its role irrespective that the ultimate decision as to whether
the defendant was sentenced to life or death is imposed solely by the
189
court.
In keeping with the principal concerns pertaining to pre-Furman imposition of death penalties, the United States Supreme Court continued to hold
that a sentencing scheme which provided an advisory recommendation to
the judge was valid and that the judge need only consider the jury’s recom190
mendation to adequately prevent arbitrary and capricious sentencing.
Under a challenge to Alabama’s capital sentencing structure, the Supreme
Court in Harris rejected the defendant’s arguments that the Eighth Amendment required the judge to give “great weight” to the jury’s advisory rec191
ommendation sentence.
The Court, by way of the Spaziano precedent,
held that although the judge was required to place great weight upon the
jury’s recommendation: “[T]he Constitution permits the trial judge, acting
192
alone, to impose a capital sentence.” Furthermore, the Court re-stated the
“hallmark” of the constitutional analysis with regard to the imposition of
185 Id. at 379 (“If the jury’s ‘sentence’ were indeed the dispositive sentence, the Alabama scheme
would be unconstitutional.”).
186 Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001).
187 Id. at 684, 687.
188 Id. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 340-41 (1985) (noting that a violation of the
Eighth Amendment occurs when the determination of the death penalty rests with a sentencer who has
been led to believe that accountability for determining appropriateness of defendant’s death rests somewhere else).
189 Greer, 264 F.3d at 684, 687.
190 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 511 (1995).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 515. The Court noted that ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (e) (1994), capital sentencing scheme
was similar to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, FLA. STAT. §. 921.141(3) (1985). However, the two
States differed in as much as the Florida Supreme Court has held that the trial judge must give “great
weight” to the jury’s recommendation. Id. at 508-09.
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death in the hands of the state: the “[statutory] scheme [must] adequately
193
channel[] the sentencer’s discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.”
As can be seen by the foregoing cases, Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme, as well as those similar in procedure, were victorious when challenged before the United States Supreme Court under several constitutional
grounds. Under the Supreme Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, a
state’s “sentencing scheme [must] adequately channel[] the sentencer’s dis194
cretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.” Regardless of this requirement,
Florida’s Supreme Court case law created the Tedder standard; an extra
layer of protection triggered only when the court overrode a jury’s advisory
195
sentence. In essence, the standard requires that “to sustain a sentence of
death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reason196
able person could differ.”
Though the Constitution is not offended by a sentencing scheme that
197
permits the judge to decide the final imposition of a death sentence, other
198
states have followed Florida’s lead and adopted the Tedder standard. In
addition to following Florida’s scheme, other states have defended their
own states sentencing scheme by asserting Florida’s capital sentencing
199
structure and its similarities to theirs. Arizona successfully utilized Florida’s “Supreme Court” approved sentencing scheme in Walton to support its
argument; however, as this Comment will later discuss, the decision in
Walton would perhaps mark the beginning of a change in how the United
States Supreme Court would view sentencing factors versus elements of a
200
crime in light of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.

193

Id. at 511.
Id.
195 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam).
196 Id. at 910.
197 Harris, 513 U.S. at 511; see also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464 (holding that no federal constitutional right exist to jury sentencing even for a capital offense).
198 Michael F. McTaggart, Criminal Law: 2003 Delaware Supreme Court Decisions, 7 DEL. L.
REV 89, 98 (2004), (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court in applying the Tedder standard in Pennell
v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992) had in essence adopted established Florida capital punishment
jurisprudence); see also John M. Richardson, Reforming the Jury Override System: Protecting Capital
Defendant’s Rights by Returning to the System’s Original Purpose, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 455
(2004) (recognizing the Tedder standard overrides the scheme as it is currently administered in Florida
and Alabama, which raises real policy and constitutional concerns).
199 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
200 See infra, at page 135, section entitled “The Turning Point for Judicially Imposed Sentences,”
which points out that while Arizona was successful in its argument before the Supreme Court specifically through the precedent of Hildwin, as well as noting that Florida’s and Arizona’s sentencing
schemes were similar, the Supreme Court would ultimately hold Arizona’s sentencing statute unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See also Walton, 497 U.S. 639 at 710-11 (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (noting that the history of trial by jury in criminal cases as well as English common law, held
194
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In Walton v. Arizona, the Court held that death penalty aggravating
factors were sentencing factors, and not elements of a crime; therefore, a
finding of fact, on the aggravating factors did not constitutionally require a
201
jury determination.
Walton was convicted of first-degree murder when
the jury determined that Walton had robbed, abducted and shot the victim
with a .22 caliber derringer gun once in the back of the head after driving
202
him to the middle of the desert. At trial, the medical examiner testified
that the victim had survived the gunshot, regained consciousness, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia approximately a
203
day before his body was found. Similar to the process in Florida, the trial
judge conducted a separate sentencing hearing required by Arizona’s sen204
tencing scheme.
Whereas Florida’s system calls for a jury to provide an advisory recommendation, Arizona permitted the judge alone to determine the existence
or nonexistence of any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances as
205
proscribed by Arizona State Statute § 13-703, subsections (F) and (G).
During the post-trial sentencing process, the court found two aggravating
206
circumstances were present and that “no mitigating circumstances suffi207
ciently substantial to call for leniency” were present. Walton was sen208
tenced to death.
Since the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
209
found Arizona’s death penalty statute to be unconstitutional, the Supreme
210
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Walton's Sixth Amendment argument articulated that a jury, not a judge, had to make all findings
of fact effecting the sentencing decision; moreover, Arizona’s death penalty

that the “[jury]. . . [a]s fact-finder . . . had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was
guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense.”).
201 Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48.
202 Id. at 644.
203 Id. at 644-45.
204 See id. at 647-49; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989).
205 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989) (Subsection (F) defines 10 aggravating circumstances
that may be considered; subsection (G) defines mitigating circumstances as any factors ‘which are
relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not
limited to” five specified factors).
206 Walton, 497 U.S. at 646 (The two aggravating factors found were (1) the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, § 13-703 (F)(6), and (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. § 13-703 (F)(5)).
207 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 646.
208 Id. at 655-56.
209 See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1023 (1988) (holding that the Arizona statutory
scheme for imposing the death penalty erroneously lists elements of the offense as factors to be determined by the sentencing judge, and thus deprives a person of his right to a jury decision on the elements
of the crime and is therefore in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
210 Walton, 497 U.S. at 639.
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statute would be constitutional if a judge would impose a sentence based on
a jury’s decision as to what aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
211
present. The Supreme Court rejected Walton’s argument and held “[a]ny
argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of
death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has
212
been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.”
Florida’s capital punishment scheme played a vital role in the Walton
decision as evidenced by the Court’s use of the standard established in
Proffitt, Spaziano and Hildwin; reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment did
not require a jury to identify the aggravating factors that permit the imposi213
tion of capital punishment. When Walton attempted to distinguish Florida’s system from that of Arizona’s, the Court made a compelling assessment of the two capital sentencing schemes,
. . . Florida[’s] jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the
trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury's
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial
214
judge in Arizona.
The Court kept aggravating factors out of the jury’s reach by classifying them as mere standards that guide a judge when choosing between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment and not as elements of
215
an offense that require jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt.
Walton’s challenge as to what constituted an element of a crime as op216
posed to an aggravating factor was the not the first challenge of its kind.
When confronted with this determination the United States Supreme Court
217
deferred to the power of a state’s legislature to make the determination.
By relying on McMillan, which did not involve a capital sentencing
scheme, the United States Supreme Court addressed a fundamental issue
surrounding various challenges to capital punishment sentencing schemes:
“there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sen218
tence turns on specific findings of fact.”
McMillan established that the state could not only determine what was
an element of a crime and its related burden of proof to be found by a jury,
but could also establish what constituted a sentencing factor, which placed
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id.
Id.
Id. at 647-48 (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447; Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638).
Id. at 648.
See id. at 649-50.
McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 408.
See McMillian, 477 U.S. at 93.
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219

the decision-making in the hands of the court. Justice Stevens, dissenting
and filing a separate opinion in a 5-4 decision, argued that there should be
some constitutional limit that permits a legislative declaration which pre220
scribes conduct and is not an element of a crime. This, Stevens emphasized, would undermine the significance of the reasonable-doubt standard
221
as well as the Constitution itself.
Throughout his dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens has remained consistent in advocating that constitutional limitations require a jury and not
the court to determine the proper sentence when determinations of fact
222
needed to be made.
Justice Stevens was certain that the Sixth Amendment required that a jury must establish the determination of facts before
223
the death penalty may be imposed. Recent jurisprudence supports Justice
Stevens’ steadfast position.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EVALUATES SENTENCING
CONSIDERATIONS
One year after holding that sentencing considerations that increase a
statutory maximum penalty do not absolutely trigger constitutional consid224
erations, the Court reversed itself and concluded that facts which trigger
an increase in maximum sentences need to be submitted to a jury and
225
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Almendarez-Torres, the defendant
illegally re-entered the United States after being convicted of a crime and
226
227
deported. Pursuant to a penalty provision, a court was able to impose a

219

Id.
See id. 95-103 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (fearing that the majority’s decision could undermine the
Constitution, Justice Stevens argued that “conduct which exposes a criminal defendant to greater . . .
punishment” requires the Due Process protection; fearing that the majority decisions could undermine
the Constitution).
221 Id. at 102.
222 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467-80 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (calling for heightened procedural safeguards because death penalty is qualitatively
different from any other punishment that a representative cross section of the community must be given
the responsibility for making that decision); McMillan 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“A state
legislature may not dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it
targets for severe criminal penalties.”); Walton, 497 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment”); Harris v. Alabama,
513 U.S. 504, 526 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court today casts a cloud over the legitimacy of
our capital sentencing jurisprudence.”).
223 Id.
224 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
225 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999).
226 Almendarez-Torres , 523 U.S. at 226.
227 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (b)(2) (authorized a court to impose a maximum prison term of 20 years for
“any alien described” in subsection (a), if the initial “deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of an aggravated felony.”)
220
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higher sentence when a defendant, with a prior conviction unlawfully re228
entered the United States after deportation.
In the opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court established that
the statute permitting the government to determine the proper sentence was
229
in fact a sentencing provision and not an element of crime.
The Court
looked to Congress and the “statute’s language, structure, subject matter,
context, and history” when determining the difference between an element
230
and a factor.
However, the Court took a completely different approach
231
232
Although factually different,
when deciding Jones v. United States.
Almendarez-Torres and Jones dealt with sentencing factors that were ex233
empt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.
234
The petitioner in Jones was convicted of armed car jacking. Under
the federal statute, anyone convicted of car jacking, absent any aggravating
235
factors, could face a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years.
However, if any of the enumerated factors were found to be present, the court
236
could impose a maximum penalty of twenty-five years. The indictment
simply listed the carjacking offense with a maximum exposure of fifteen
237
During the sentencing phase, the government recomyears in prison.
mended a sentence of twenty-five years because one of the victims had suf238
fered serious bodily injury. The petitioner argued that the higher penalty
sought by the government was “out of bounds,” since the issue of fact as to
whether the victims had sustained serious bodily injury was an element of
239
the crime and thus needed to be proven before a jury.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, distinguished their holding in Almendarez-Torres by regarding that prior convictions were the exception to a
228

Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S. at 227.
Id. at 227
230 Id. at 228.
231 See Jones, 526 U.S. 227.
232 The defendant in Jones was convicted of car-jacking; a violent felony involving the use of a
firearm. Id. at 229-31. The defendant in Almendarez-Torres, however, illegally re-entered the United
States after being deported, and no violence was implicated. Id. at 227.
233 Id. at 229.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 230.
236 Id. at 230; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V) The statute states in relevant part:
229

Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has
been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall—(1) be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of
years up to life, or both.
237
238
239

Jones, 526 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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rule that “facts establishing higher penalties must be treated procedurally
240
similar to offense elements.” The Court, rejecting the statute’s form over
its substance and treating what appeared to be sentencing factors as ele241
ments of a crime, established the “maximum penalty test.” To determine
whether a fact is a sentencing factor or an element of the crime, the Court
looked to whether “the finding of such a fact would increase the maximum
242
penalty available for that crime.”
The dissent asserted that this decision would cause a “disruption and
243
The dissent quesuncertainty in the sentencing systems of the States.”
244
tioned the holding in Walton, by noting that whereas a judge’s findings
may increase the punishment for murder to death, “it is constitutionally
impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the maximum punish245
ment for carjacking by 10 years. The ruling and proposition put forth by
the holding in Jones called into question judicially-imposed sentences and
246
transformed the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
THE TURNING POINT FOR JUDICIALLY IMPOSED SENTENCES
On March 28, 2000, when the Supreme Court heard arguments on Apprendi v. New Jersey, the predictions made by the Walton dissenters proved
247
to be accurate. The petitioner was arrested and charged for firing shots
248
into the home of an African-American family.
While Charles Apprendi
was subsequently indicted on numerous charges as well as the unlawful
possession of a firearm, the state accepted a plea of guilty on two counts of
second-degree possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful posses249
sion of a bomb. The statute for possession of a firearm carried a sentenc250
ing range of five to ten years.
However, under a separate New Jersey
“hate crime” statute, a judge could impose an extended imprisonment term

240

Id. 230-35; see Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Reality of Blakely, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5, 9

(2005).
241

See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 410.
Id.
243 Jones, at 271 (Kennedy, J.; O’Connor, J.; Rehnquist, J.; Breyer, J. dissenting). The dissent’s
fear of disruption among sentencing guidelines would eventually come true. See United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), discussed below.
244 Walton, 497 U.S. 639 (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine
the aggravating factors which permit the imposition of capital punishment).
245 Jones, 526 U.S. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court should have chosen
Walton for its new approach).
246 Jason E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide: Out of the
Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REV 519, 537 (2004).
247 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
248 Id. at 469 (although this statement was later retracted, the petitioner had stated that he did not
want the family in his neighborhood because of their race).
249 Id. at 469-70.
250 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 39-4(a) and 43-6(a)(2) (West 1995).
242
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if evidence demonstrated that a defendant committed a crime with the purpose to “intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race,
251
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”
After accepting the petitioner’s plea, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi’s purpose in committing the
252
crime and concluded that “that the crime was motivated by racial bias.”
Based on the “hate crime” statute that permitted a judicially imposed en253
hancement, Apprendi was sentenced to a term of twelve years. Supported
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Apprendi appealed his
sentence arguing that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sen254
tence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Had the hate crime enhancement not been triggered, Apprendi would have
255
been exposed to a maximum sentence of five to ten years.
Based on
256
257
precedents such as McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, New Jersey took
the position that the enhancement statute was a sentencing factor as op258
posed to an element of the crime.
However, the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, implemented the “maximum penalty test” and rejected the State’s
argument, holding that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
259
beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court also noted that, as applied to state
260
In analaws, the Fourteenth Amendment mandated the same response.
lyzing the issues, the Court relied heavily on the historical foundation and
recognition of the guarantee in all criminal prosecutions of the right to a
261
While re-affirming the Almendarezpublic trial by an impartial jury.
Torres ruling to permit prior convictions, the Court distinguished McMillan
by asserting that the statute in McMillan involved a statute that “only
raise[d] the minimum sentence that may be imposed and neither alter[ed]

251 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 469. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (authorizing the trial court to
impose an extended sentencing term if the defendant is found to have committed the crime with intent to
“intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity”).
252 Id. at 471.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 471.
255 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 39-4(a) (West 1995).
256 McMillan, 477 U.S. 79.
257 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224.
258 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
259 Id. at 476.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 478.
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the maximum sentence nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a sepa262
rate penalty.”
As the dissenters’ had predicted in Walton, Justice O’Connor dissented, responding that the decision in Apprendi “[would] surely be re263
membered as a watershed change in constitutional law.” By carving out an
exception to capital punishment jurisprudence, the Court was able to distinguish and maintain intact the prior decision in Walton, although the door
was now wide open for continued evolution regarding capital punishment
264
and the Sixth Amendment.
Twelve years after its holding in Walton which accepted the Arizona
265
death penalty system, the Court revisited Arizona’s capital punishment
statute, and on June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that the
266
In
Arizona statute violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.
267
Ring v. Arizona, the petitioner was tried and found guilty of felony mur268
der occurring in the commission of an armed robbery. Arizona’s capital
punishment sentencing scheme prescribed that the petitioner could only be
sentenced to death if a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing
269
made further findings. It was during this separate sentencing hearing that
the judge had to determine the presence of statutorily enumerated aggravat270
ing circumstances and/or mitigating circumstances. To impose the death
penalty, the court, sitting alone, needed only to find one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances “sufficiently substantial to call
271
for leniency.”
As a result of the separate sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced the
272
petitioner to death. Ring appealed arguing that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial by allowing
273
a judicially imposed sentence that raises a defendant’s maximum penalty.
In applying the “maximum penalty test” as created and later put to use in
274
Apprendi, the Court concluded that under Arizona law, the “death sentence [could] not [be] legally . . . imposed . . . unless at least one aggravat275
Therefore, the
ing factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.”
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id. at 486; McMillian, 477 U.S. at 90; see also Barsanti, supra note 246, at 539.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 523.
See Walton, 497 U.S. 639.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
Id.
Id.
ARIZ. STAT. REV. § 13-703 (2001).
See Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
ARIZ. STAT. REV. § 13-703 (2001)
See Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
Id.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.
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aggravating factor could not be established by the judge under the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
276
Amendment; it required that a jury determine the aggravating factor.
The State of Arizona argued that the aggravating factors were only
sentencing factors, providing a sentencing range between death or life imprisonment and that Ring was sentenced within the range of punishment
277
authorized by the jury verdict.
The Court rejected this argument and
pointed out that by cross-referencing the statute to a statutory provision that
required a finding of an aggravating circumstance prior to the imposition of
death, “Arizona’[s] first-degree murder statute authorizes a maximum pen278
alty of death only in a formal sense.”
Arizona expressed that the judicially determinative factors were designed to overcome “the arbitrary impo279
sition of the death penalty.” The Court countered by declaring that while
the pursuit of fairness was admirable, it was not decisive in overriding the
280
jury trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
By applying the principles of Apprendi to capital punishment, the
Court overruled Walton and continued to expand its statutory analysis with
judicially imposed sentencing by maintaining that, “[i]f a State makes an
increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding
of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it--must be found by a
281
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” One can truly gauge the Court’s developing jurisprudence with regards to sentencing factors and constitutionally
protected limitations with a concurring opinion in Ring by Justice Scalia
who, in Walton v. Arizona, had upheld the state’s sentencing scheme:
“[s]ince Walton, I have acquired new wisdom[,] . . . to put it more critically,
282
[I] have discarded old ignorance.
THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO ACQUIRE NEW WISDOM
The Court had an opportunity to expand its previous rulings in Ap283
prendi and Ring when it granted certiorari in Blakely v. Washington. In
Blakely, the petitioner was arrested for abducting his estranged wife by
binding her with duct tape and forcing her at knifepoint into a wooden box
276

Id.
Id. at 603-04.
278 Ring, 536 U.S. at 585.
279 Ring, 536 U.S. at 607. Recall that the Furman decision required the states to provide statutory
factors, which provide the sentencer guidance in the sentencing process.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 585-86. See also Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme
Court and The Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U.. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2002) (noting that the delay of the Court
to apply the Apprendi principle to all capital punishment sentencing schemes put into doubt the supposed Eighth Amendment principle of “heightened reliability” applicable to capital cases).
282 Ring, 536 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring).
283 See Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
277
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284

in the bed of his pickup truck. The petitioner subsequently plead guilty to
second-degree kidnapping, a class B felony which, based on the admitted
285
facts of the plea, exposed him to a maximum sentence of 53 months.
However, under Washington law, a judge was permitted to sentence above
the standard range if during the sentencing phase, the judge, sitting alone,
made a finding of fact as to the presence of statutorily enumerated aggravat286
ing factors. After a three day bench hearing, the judge determined that the
petitioner had acted with deliberate cruelty and imposed a 90-month sentence, almost twice the sentence from what the admitted facts of the plea
287
exposed him to.
The petitioner’s argued that the sentencing procedure
288
violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
The Court was quick to point out that the case required the application
289
of the rule developed in Apprendi: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea290
sonable doubt.”
Washington argued that since the applicable statutory
maximum for a class B felony was ten years, and not 53 months, Blakely’s
sentence was not beyond the statutory maximum and therefore Apprendi
291
did not apply.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected Washington’s statutory
maximum argument and clarified that the statutory maximum was, “the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” for Apprendi pur292
poses. Relying on constitutional structure and noting that the Framers put
a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution, the majority illustrated that the
jury was vested with “rightful control in the judicial department” and that
293
the source of a judge’s authority to sentence came from the jury’s verdict.
In reversing the Washington Court of Appeals holding, the Court instructed
the state to submit its accusations to “the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
294
[Blakeley’s] equals and neighbors.
The dissent argued that Washington had implemented a system of
guided discretion in order to afford equal protection to combat racial dispar-

284

Id. at 298.
Id. at 298-99
286 Id.
287 Id. at 300.
288 Id. at 301.
289 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
290 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
291 Id. at 303; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West 2000).
292 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
293 Id. at 306 (noting that without the authority from the jury’s verdict, the Framer’s intent in the
Sixth Amendment would be lost).
294 Id. at 313-14.
285
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295

ity because of unstructured review.
Furthermore, the dissent noted that
because both criminal history and the character of a defendant were barred
from the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding for their prejudicial effects,
the State might incur the additional cost associated with a “full-blown jury”
296
in the sentencing phase. The dissenters argued that the ruling in Blakely
would impact the Guidelines because judges were permitted to make determinations of fact that increased sentencing ranges beyond the jury ver297
298
dict alone, despite the majority’s protestations to the contrary.
299
Merely six months after its holding in Blakely, the Court heard arguments on the issue of whether the United States Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment since the guidelines allowed judges to impose enhanced sentences based on determinations of facts, other than prior
300
301
convictions.
In United States v. Booker, the petitioner faced a maximum statutory sentence range of 210-to-262 months when his prior conviction was taken into consideration along with the conviction of possessing at
302
least fifty grams of crack cocaine during sentencing. However, the peti303
tioner was sentenced to 360 months.
This increase in sentencing was
possible since the Guidelines authorized departures from the set sentencing
range when a judge found aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a
304
kind, or to a degree.
The Court began its analysis by affirming that the applicable sentenc305
ing rules were mandatory on all judges. The Court further clarified that
had the rules been merely advisory, a court’s ability to select a particular
sentence based on circumstances and facts would not implicate the Sixth
306
Amendment. The Court concluded that there was no difference between
the sentence imposed in Blakely and the sentence imposed under the instant
case, and thus the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were subject to the jury
307
trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment.
The Court maintained that
the principle for their decision was not “the product of recent innovations,”
295
296
297
298

Id. at 318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 305 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on

them.”).
299

Id. at 296.
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
301 Id. at 738,
302 See generally id.
303 Id. at 742 (the court noted that the sentence imposed by the judge was 10 years longer than the
range supported by the verdict alone).
304 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp.2004) (this provision allowed the judge to on a caseby-case basis evaluate circumstance that may have not been taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission and which should result in a different sentence from those described).
305 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 742.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 744-45.
300
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but was rooted in the “ideals [the] constitution assimilated from the com308
mon law.”
The majority rejected the dissents contention that the Sentencing
Guidelines enjoyed a “traditional judicial authority to increase sentences
[by] . . . taking [into] account . . . any unusual blameworthiness in the man309
ner employed in committing a crime.” The majority responded by noting
that “in today's world,” tradition did not provide a “sound guide to en310
forcement of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.”
ANALYSIS
REVIEWING FLORIDA’S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEME IN LIGHT OF
APPRENDI, RING, BLAKELY AND BOOKER
The string of cases reviewed clearly shows that under the Eighth
Amendment a state’s capital punishment statute must provide guided discretion to a jury or sentencer in determining whether the imposition of
311
death is applicable. Moreover, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a
jury must consider aggravating circumstances, other than that the defendant
was previously convicted, in order to result in the imposition of the maxi312
mum punishment authorized by the verdict.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory maximum, including the imposition of death, as the maximum a defendant is
exposed to by virtue of the jury’s verdict irrespective of whether the maximum is attached to the actual crime being charged or a separate statute
313
which enhances the punishment.
Apprendi, Ring, and more recently
Blakely and Booker clearly indicate the position the United States Supreme
Court has taken with regard to the imposition of sentences that are not
solely determined by a jury. This Comment’s position that Florida’s death
penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional is dependent on several primary propositions.

308 Id. at 753 (the Court emphasized that the Framers feared the threat of “judicial despotism”
which could occur absent a jury from “arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions”).
309 Id. at 751.
310 Id.
311 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
312 Id.; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (These amendments are
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.)
313 See Ring, 536 U.S. 589-602 (outlining the meaning of statutory maximum, “[a] defendant may
not be “exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone . . . [t]his prescription governs. . . even if the State characterizes
the additional findings made by the judge as “sentencing factors”); the Court further addressed whether
this definition applied to capital defendants, “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . .
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment”). Id at 589.
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First, the role of the jury in Florida’s sentencing scheme is merely ad314
visory and not determinative.
Second, under Florida’s sentencing structure the maximum sentence a judge may impose on a defendant convicted
of capital murder, solely on the jury’s verdict, is life imprisonment, and not
315
death. Third, the guidelines placed in the statute such as the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors in the death penalty sentencing phase is
316
mandatory under the mandates of Furman. Fourth, the mere presence of
aggravating factors in and of themselves is not outcome determinative as to
317
the imposition of death. And fifth, it is the outcome of the balancing of
opposing factors, aggravating against mitigating, which ultimately deter318
mines whether or not the death penalty is appropriate; a role which the
319
jury and not the judge should be carrying out.
THE “TRUE” ROLE OF THE JURY
Florida’s Supreme Court continues to hold that its death penalty sen320
tencing scheme is constitutionally valid. In Bottoson v. Moore, Florida’s
Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the implications of Apprendi
321
and Ring on Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.
Linroy Bottoson was
convicted for first-degree murder and in accordance with the jury’s recom322
mendation, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. During the sentencing phase, the judge imposed the death sentence after determining the
presence of the following aggravating circumstances: petitioner had previously been convicted of a violent crime; the murder was committed during
the commission of a felony and for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and that
323
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” The trial judge
324
found no mitigating circumstances.
While Bottoson was unsuccessful in his appeals to Florida’s Supreme
Court under a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court post325
poned his execution while it decided Ring. On June 28, 2002, after decid314

See supra note 95, (the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (West 2003).
316 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
317 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (West 2003).
318 Id.
319 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (holding that statutory maximum is the maximum a judge may
impose without additional findings). See also Ring, 536 U.S. 584 (the Court applied Apprendi to capital
sentencing scheme); Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (holding that additional facts a judged found under a sentencing scheme which was mandatory and restricted judicial discretion when imposing sentences violates the Sixth Amendment).
320 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002). See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 432.
321 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).
322 Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 1983).
323 Id. at 967.
324 Id.
325 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695.
315
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ing Ring, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bottoson’s
326
case, which in turn ended the stay on his execution. The Florida Supreme
Court interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari as
indicating that Florida’s death penalty statute was constitutional and consis327
tent with Ring. Although, the United States Supreme Court declined to
hear the Bottoson case, the Florida Supreme Court was incorrect when they
summarily perceived this to mean that Florida’s death penalty was constitutional irrespective of Ring since it is “well-settled . . . that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning the court’s view of the
328
merits.”
Furthermore, Justice Wells noted that if the Ring case had somehow
compromised the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty statute, the
Supreme Court would likely not have removed the stay knowing that the
petitioner would be executed. Instead, the Court would have remanded the
case for further consideration. What neither Justice Wells or the U.S. Supreme Court considered, however, was whether rule in Ring could apply
retroactively to criminal cases on final or direct appeal.
On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the rule
in Ring did not apply retroactively to death penalty cases already on final or
329
direct review. The Court in Summerlin held that the Ring decision merely
altered the method of determining the presence of facts not changing the
330
facts themselves.
As further justification for upholding Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme, the Florida Supreme Court pointed out that Florida’s death penalty
statute had been thoroughly scrutinized and held to be constitutional by the
331
United States Supreme Court over the past twenty-six years.
One such
332
case used to support the court’s position was Hildwin v. Florida. However, the Hildwin case was one of the cases utilized by the Supreme Court
in Walton v. Arizona to uphold the now unconstitutional Arizona statute in
which a judge was permitted to determine sentencing factors without the
333
assistance of a jury.
While the Supreme Court later overruled Walton

326

Id. at 697.
Id. at 698 (Wells, J. concurring).
328 Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262 n.11 (1982); see also Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940,
944 (1978) (holding that the “Court has rigorously insisted that . . . a denial [of certiorari] carries with it
no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to
review.”).
329 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) (holding that the Ring decision did not apply
retroactively to death penalty cases already on final review because the Ring decision was procedural
and not substantive).
330 Id. at 2524.
331 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697.
332 Id. at 695 n.4.
333 Walton, 497 U.S. 639.
327
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with Ring, the Florida Supreme Court continues to distinguish Florida’s
334
sentencing scheme from that which was used in Arizona.
The Florida Supreme Court holds to the distinction that while Arizona’s statute permitted a judge to determine the presence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances without a jury, under Florida’s statute, a judge
335
does not sit alone. A judge and a jury hear the evidence and then based
on the advisory sentence of the jury, the judge decides whether the imposi336
tion of death is warranted. The distinction of this jury-involvement procedure that the court points to is weak seeing as the United States Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he dispositive question . . . is one not of form, but of
337
effect.”
The jury’s true effect in Florida under its capital sentencing
scheme was clear to the United States Supreme Court when it held that,
[a] Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of
fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona
because in Florida[,] the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not
make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not bind338
ing on the trial judge.
Is there a difference between Florida’s jury advisory sentence and Arizona’s judge who sits alone? Perhaps in form there is, yet in substance is
there a distinction? A clarification of the jury’s role in Florida’s scheme is
needed to truly determine whether there is a difference.
After a defendant is found guilty of capital murder, a separate proceed339
ing is commenced. During this sentencing phase, the prosecution and the
defense introduce aggravating and mitigating evidence before a judge and
340
jury. At the conclusion, the jury must weigh the factors and by a majority
341
render an advisory sentence to the judge.
This advisory opinion is not
binding on the court for the court must independently weigh the circum342
Under existing Florida law, a judge
stances and enter its own decision.

334 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 699 (Quince, J. concurring) (the United States Supreme Court receded
Walton because the Arizona statute allowed “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of death penalty[;] [t]his language alone distinguishes
the Florida death scheme from Arizona[’s]”).
335 Id.
336 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 700.
337 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
338 Walton, 497 U.S. 648. See also Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result
only) (noting that Florida’s Supreme Court cannot ignore the impact of Ring and the Supreme Court’s
comparison of Arizona’s and Florida’s death penalty schemes).
339 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2002).
340 Id.
341 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2002).
342 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2002). However, the trial judge must accord deference to the jury’s
recommendation. See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
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may find aggravating circumstances, during a post-sentencing hearing, that
343
were never offered before a jury. Furthermore, if a death sentence is imposed, it is the judge’s findings of fact that are reduced to writing, not the
344
jury’s. Without the jury’s written records of findings, an appellate court
would not be able to review what, if any factors a jury found to be present
during the sentencing phase. Therefore, the extent of the jury’s role in the
sentencing phase becomes unclear, because during a post-conviction appeal, the appellate court cannot give adequate consideration to a jury’s recommended sentence, since it is the judge’s finding of facts which are re345
viewed.
Additionally, it appears as if the role of the jury is at times not as vital
346
as the Florida Supreme Court in Bottoson claimed it to be. In Sochor v.
Florida, the United States Supreme Court reversed an affirmed decision by
the Florida Supreme Court where the petitioner argued that his Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment was violated when
during the sentencing phase the jury weighed an aggravating factor that was
347
not enumerated in Florida’s Statue. The Florida Supreme Court held the
348
error to be harmless and affirmed the trial courts holding. The petitioner
appealed to the United States Supreme Court and although the court vacated and remanded, Florida argued before the Court that the error was
harmless because after all, the trial judge is the sentencer, and the jury
349
merely functions in an advisory capacity.
350
While only three states use a “hybrid” sentencing system, only
Delaware requires a unanimous decision when determining the presence of

343

Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 1998).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b) (2002).
345 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 724 (Pariente, J. concurring in result only) (observing that in Washington v. State, 835 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2002), where the trial judge overrode a jury’s recommendation for life
sentence and on appeal at that time, the court could evaluate the jury’s consideration of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances). See also id. at 708 (Anstead, C.J. concurring in result only) (noting that
a potential Furman problem arises because the jury’s recommendation is not supported by findings of
fact and thus a reviewing court will not be able to accurately determine what factors the jury found when
making its recommendation).
346 See generally Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).
347 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).
348 Sochor v. State, 580 So.2d 595, 604 (1991).
349 See Sochor, 504 U.S. 527 (respondent’s brief 1992 WL 606715 (U.S.) (Under Florida's sentencing scheme, the jury's role is strictly advisory. The trial judge makes independent factual findings, in
writing, to support a sentence of death).
350 These states are Florida, Alabama and Delaware. See Aarons, supra note 86, at 18; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187, 198 (1976) (noting that Georgia’s new sentencing scheme required that a jury
make specific findings of facts as to the presence of aggravating and or mitigating circumstances before
the imposition of death); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1976) (the basic difference between
the Florida system and the Georgia system is that in Florida the trial judge determines the sentence
rather than the jury; the Florida procedures for imposition of the death penalty satisfy the constitutional
deficiencies identified in Furman).
344
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351

aggravating and or mitigating factors. Florida does not require a unanimous decision when deciding the presence of aggravating or mitigating
352
factors. Justice Anstead, concurring in result only in Bottoson argued that
Apprendi and Ring mandated that “aggravating sentencing factors, just like
353
elements of a crime, must be found by a unanimous jury vote.” Although
not available to the majority in Bottoson, the United States Supreme Court
in Blakely held that, “[t]he Framers would not have thought it too much to
demand that, before depriving a man of . . . his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors . . . rather than a lone em354
ployee of the State.” In Blakely the Court further noted that whereas suffrage provides a balance in favor of the people over elected officials in the
legislative and executive branches, a right to a jury trial allows this control
355
over the judiciary.
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE
Apprendi mandated that any fact, not including a prior conviction,
which increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, must be sub356
mitted to a jury. Ring expanded the application of Apprendi to encompass
357
capital punishment statutes. The Florida Supreme Court in Bottoson held
that the traditional definition of maximum statutory sentence is “that sentence which a state legislature or Congress has determined to be the outer
358
limit of what can be imposed for a particular crime.” As applied to Florida, this would translate that upon conviction of a capital felony, death
359
would be the maximum statutory sentence. Yet, mandatory death penalty
statutes that expose a defendant to death solely based on the trial jury’s ver360
dict are unconstitutional. Recall that in Dobbert, the United States Court
351 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(3)(b)(1) (stating that “in order to find the existence of a
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e). . . beyond a reasonable doubt the
jury must be unanimous as to the existence of that statutory aggravating circumstance). However the
jury’s decision is not binding on the judge. Ortiz v. State, 869 A. 2d 285, 309-10 (Del. 2005).
352 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-49; FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2).
353 Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 709 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J. concurring).
354 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004).
355 Id. at 2538.
356 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury . . . and
established beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
357 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that Walton and Apprendi were irreconcilable and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence required that aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty be found by a jury).
358 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 700.
359 Id. at 700 n.10.
360 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (finding that mandatory death
penalty statutes are unconstitutional because they fall short of allowing the sentencer to consider relevant aspects of the character a convicted defendant before the imposition of a sentence of death).
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361

held that being sentenced to death in Florida was “not automatic.” For
this reason, the mandates of Furman and Woodson require the states to conduct a separate proceeding to determine whether the imposition of death is
362
appropriate.
It is during this separate procedure under Florida’s death
penalty sentencing scheme that the defendant is in fact exposed to the pos363
sibility of being sentenced to death.
In Ring, Arizona argued that the
364
statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder was death. However,
the Court held that Arizona’s first-degree murder statute cross-referenced a
separate sentencing section which directed the judge to “conduct a separate
sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of certain
365
circumstances before imposing the sentence.”
If Florida’s sentencing
structure parallels Arizona’s statute in design, in that the trial jury’s verdict
alone will not be sufficient to impose the penalty of death on the defendant,
then Florida’s sentencing scheme is bound by the rules developed in Apprendi and Ring. Although the definition of “statutory maximum” may be
366
difficult to discern, the Court in Blakely provided guidance. Blakely explained that a statutory maximum, under an Apprendi application, was the
maximum sentence a judge could impose “solely on the basis of the facts
367
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” The Blakely
Court went on to hold that a judge, who imposes a sentence beyond the
368
Despite the precedent, the
jury’s verdict, has exceeded his authority.
Florida Supreme Court continues to find the death penalty statute constitu369
tional.
WEIGHING OF THE FACTORS: MANDATORY GUIDELINES
A court must follow Florida’s death penalty scheme when determining
370
whether an individual should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

361

Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 267 (1972). See Diamond, supra note, 21; Woodson, 428
U.S. at 304 (noting that the “Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual defendant.”).
363 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2).
364 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002).
365 Id. (“Arizona[’s] first-degree murder statute [resembling Florida’s murder statute], authorize[d]
a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense, for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty.”).
366 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
367 Id. at 2537.
368 Id.
369 See State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla. 2004); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 965 (Fla.
2004).
370 FLA. STAT. § 941.141(1) (stating that, “the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding
. . .”) (emphasis added).
362
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The trial court’s verdict alone does not sentence an individual to death. It
is the legislatively created mandate, separate from the statute prescribing
the offense, which ultimately exposes a defendant to death. The United
States Supreme Court, through its capital punishment jurisprudence, has
held that the determination to impose the death penalty on a given individual must be provided by a sentencer who is governed by a procedure which
372
furnishes guidance in determining the ultimate sentence.
Although the
United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Booker v. United States
dealt with federal sentencing guidelines, implications to Florida’s death
373
penalty guidelines may be inferred.
Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, the Court in Booker held that the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applied to mandatory sentencing
schemes and therefore, relevant facts required to impose a sentence must be
374
determined by juries, not judges. The Federal Guidelines bound the sen375
tencing court in Booker; the judge was mandated to follow the provisions.
The Court concluded that because these guidelines were mandatory, they
376
had the force and effect of laws. As was the sentencing court in Booker,
the sentencing court in Florida is bound by the hybrid-sentencing scheme
377
where the weighing of factors determines the sentence to be imposed.
The Court in Booker distinguished the mandatory guidelines from advisory
provisions holding that, “[i]f the Guidelines . . . could be read as merely
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required . . . their use
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment; [however, the] “Guidelines as
written . . . are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges .
378
Through Booker, the Court extends the protection of the Sixth
. ..”
Amendment to mandatory sentencing schemes noting that these principles
“are not the product of recent innovations in our jurisprudence, but rather
371

Id. (“Upon conviction . . . of guilt . . . of a capital felony . . . the court shall . . .) (emphasis

added).
372

See generally, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
See Behl v. Florida, 898 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. App 2 Dist 2005) (holding that the points assessed in the sentencing phase were not based on a determination made by the jury, and thus under a
presumptive sentencing structure where judges are given a narrow range of permissible sentences,
Booker mandates that a judge cannot find facts beyond those found by the jury).
374 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct 738, 742 (2005).
375 Id.
376 Id. at 749-50 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (noting that Congress
chose to “adopt a “mandatory-guideline system” rather than a system that would have been “only advisory,” and that the statute “makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding on the courts).
377 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2). While the capital punishment sentencing scheme statue in Florida is not entirely analogous to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is binding on the courts and its
origin can be traced to the Furman decision which recognized that a death penalty scheme that does not
provide the sentencing body with statutorily guided discretion violates the Eighth Amendment. See also
Madia, supra note 69, at 87 (noting that a separate sentencing phase is required under Furman and that
such a process “provides an individualized consideration of the defendant . . .”).
378 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749-50.
373
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have their genesis in the ideals our constitutional tradition assimilated from
379
the common law.” One may try to distinguish Florida’s capital sentencing scheme from the Guidelines discussed in Booker; however, they share a
380
Furthermore, other factors add to
common theme, both are mandatory.
the compulsory character of the state’s capital punishment sentencing
scheme. Its creation was based on the establishment that “the death sen381
tence is unique in its severity and its irrevocability.” Also, “the jury-trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of
the level of punishment that the defendant receives--whether the statute
calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane--must
382
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” The state’s capital punishment sentencing scheme does not appear to provide advisory provisions
that merely recommend sentencing ranges. After all, the language is quite
clear: “[T]he court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circum383
stances, shall enter a sentence of life or death . . . .” (emphasis added).
In both Duncan and Power, the Florida Supreme Court utilized the
384
trial court’s verdict during the guilt phase to avoid a Ring violation. The
sentencing court carried over the trial court jury’s findings of fact during the
guilt/innocence phase as aggravating factors in order to comply with both
the principles in Ring and Florida’s capital punishment sentencing scheme.
The court’s rationale was that the aggravating factors needed to satisfy the
imposition of death pursuant to the penalty phase were “charged by indict385
ment and found unanimously by the jury.” On the surface, this strategy
386
seems to comport with the holdings in Apprendi and Ring.
However, the court overlooks the underlying purpose of Florida’s capital punishment sentencing scheme. Furman and its progeny have held that
in order for a capital sentencing scheme to be constitutional, the statute
must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty . .
. and must justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
379

Id. at 753.
See id. at 749-750. The court is bound to weigh the factors and decide between a sentence of
life imprisonment or death. See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (comparing the
sentencing guidelines to “Gregg-type statute[s]”—referring to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 187, 153
(1976)).
381 Gregg, 428 U.S. 187.
382 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002).
383 FLA. STAT. § 941.141(3).
384 State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla. 2004) (holding that because an aggravating factor,
prior conviction of a felony, was charged in the indictment and found beyond a reasonable doubt the
imposition of the death penalty was constitutional); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 965 (Fla. 2004)
(holding that since the trail court had found that the murder was committed in the commission of various
other felonies and found beyond a reasonable doubt Ring and Apprendi were inapplicable).
385 Power, 886 So. 2d at 965.
386 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 536 U.S. 466, 482 (2000) and Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (both cases
holding other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
380
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387

compared to others found guilty of murder.” Unlike any other area, when
dealing with capital punishment, the Court has placed special constraints on
states’ “legislatures’ ability to determine what facts shall lead to . . . pun388
ishment[, and] . . . [the] ability to define crimes. Aggravating factors are
designed to guide the sentencer with a “rational criteria [which] . . . [will]
narrow [his] . . . judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular
389
defendant’s case meet the [constitutional] threshold.”
By allowing the
trial court’s factual findings to survive any Ring infirmity, the Florida Supreme Court does not consider that the sentencing statute calls for the
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, not the mere existence
390
of an aggravating factor. The outcome of weighing the opposing factors
is the process by which the sentence is ultimately determined. For if the
court relies solely on presence of the aggravating factors, the court is either
doing the actual weighing or the trial jury’s finding of fact is not being considered in light of any mitigating factors within the context of sentencing.
Mitigating factors are an intricate part of the statute’s weighing process in
as much as, “mitigating factors . . . might induce a sentencer to give a lesser
391
punishment.”
Furthermore, if the findings of fact which established the
presence of aggravating factors are permitted to be “imported” from the
guilt phase and used in the sentencing phase, other than providing a nonbinding advisory opinion, what role does the sentencing jury play? The
responsibility of the sentencing jury must be genuine because “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest the death sentence on a determination made
by a sentencer [that] has been led to believe that the responsibility for de392
termining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”
CONCLUSION
The Furman Court understood that to allow the trial jury to sentence
the defendant to death based solely on the findings of fact that it had considered to establish his guilt would not take into consideration “particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
393
death.” Therefore, it is in this subsequent proceeding that the aggravating
circumstances must be weighed against mitigating circumstances to estab-

387

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
Apprendi, 536 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
389 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
390 FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141 (2)(a), (3). (it is not the mere existence of aggravating factors, but rather
the non-existence of any outweighing mitigating circumstances that renders the imposition of the death
penalty appropriate).
391 Ring, 536 U.S. at 611.
392 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
393 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
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lish the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and char394
acteristics of the defendant.”
It is the result or conclusion of the process by which the statutory factors are weighed that truly imposes the appropriate sentence. Merely because elements of a crime, which are required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury during the guilt phase, overlap aggravating factors
that need to be weighed against mitigating factors, does not cure the state’s
constitutional infirmity. The facts determined at the trial level serve their
purpose within the trial level context in which they are established—to
prove that a crime was committed and to establish the defendant’s guilt or
395
innocence.
In cases where facts used to establish guilt overlap facts needed to determine the presence of aggravating factors, the jury’s trial findings of fact
should not be used in the context of the sentencing phase. While the need
to have the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing phase
may not be constitutionally required, at a minimum, these facts must be
weighed against mitigating factors to determine the proper sentence. In the
sentencing phase framework, the findings which ultimately determine the
proper punishment must be determined by a sentencing jury and not a
judge, for “the jury [can]not function as circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the
defendant [committed the murder] . . . a mere preliminary to a judicial in396
quisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish. In
essence, Florida does not seek to impose a sentence of death on all who
commit murder, not even those who commit murder when aggravating circumstances are established. The death penalty is sought only on those who,
after considerations insufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
During a capital murder case, the jury convicts the defendant of murder when it determines that a crime has been committed and the defendant
is responsible. This determination of guilt alone, without any additional
397
findings, does not permit the judge to impose death.
However, as in
Booker, a second proceeding is held to determine the appropriate sentence.
To reach the appropriate sentence, aggravating factors must be weighed
against mitigating factors. It is the result of this “balancing” of factors that
ultimately determines the sentence. Just as the judge in Booker found that
the defendant possessed 566 grams of crack in excess to the trial jury’s
394

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct 738, 743 (2005).
The findings of the trial jury, although relevant to the guilt or innocence of the charged crime,
do not take into account the relevant aspects of the character of the defendant or fully consider and give
effect to the mitigating evidence which Furman mandated.
396 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004).
397 FLA. STAT. § 941.141(1).
395
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398

findings, in Florida, the sentencing judge alone, in excess to the trial
jury’s finding of guilt, renders the outcome of the “balancing” of the aggra399
vating and mitigating factors. In the final analysis, this judicial determination exceeds the sentence which may be imposed solely on the basis of
the facts reflected by the jury verdict.
Consequently, as the Court held in Blakely, “the jury’s verdict alone
does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon
400
finding some additional fact.”
Since the Florida judge acquires the authority to impose the sentence of death pursuant to the capital sentencing
scheme, and not the trial court’s verdict, the actual outcome of the weighing
of the factors is a finding of fact that ultimately determines the proper sentence. In sum, “[t]here is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely, . . . the sentences imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines [in Booker], . . . and
401
the death penalty in Florida.”
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme came about from its compliance
with Furman; however, “the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates
to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is
402
imposed.” Florida’s process, while conforming to Furman, does not conform to the United State Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding
the principles behind the jury trial right. Florida can remedy this deficiency
by amending the statute and allow a jury, and not the judge, to determine
the proper sentence. After all:
jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges, . . .
they are more attuned to the community’s moral sensibility,” . . . because they “reflect more accurately the composition and experiences
of the community as a whole. Hence they are more likely to “express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death,” and better able to determine in the particular case the need for
retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the
403
only adequate response may be the penalty of death.
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401 Booker, 125 S. Ct at 743.
402 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
403 Id. at 615 (Breyer, J. concurring) (citing Justice Stevens in his long held stance that a jury is the
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